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WASHINGTON
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME II. NOVEMBER, 1926. NUMBER I.
RIGHTS OF A VENDEE UNDER AN EXECUTORY FOR-
FEITABLE CONTRACT FOR THE PURCHASE OF
REAL ESTATE. A FURTHER WORD ON THE WASH-
INGTON LAW
A LMOST two years have passed since the six-threeL decision in
L Ashford v. Reese,2 holding that in this state an executory for-
fetable contract for the sale of real estate creates no title, legal or
equitable, in the vendee. Since that time a Department of the Court
has once reaffirmed the doctrine," and the legislature has initiated,
but not consummated, an attempt to change the rule.
4
'The majority opinion of Mackintosh, J., was concurred in by Fullerton,
Mitchell, Holcomb, and Main, JJ., Askren, J., concurred reluctantly, on the
theory that a rule, though questionable, had been so long followed; Tolman,
C. J., and Bridges and Parker, JJ., dissented.
3132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925).
8Peck v. Farmers National Bank, 137 Wash. 627, 943 Pac. 861 (1926). Tins
case rests on Tieton Hotel Co. v. Manheim, 75 Wash. 641, 135 Pac. 658 (1913),
stating that this latter case was followed in Ashford v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649,
23 Pac. 29 (1925). It is pointed oat later in this article that the Tieton Hotel
Co. case appears to be overruled by Roy -v. Vaughn, 100 Wash. 345, 170 Pac.
1019 (1918). In re Kuhn's Estate, 132 Wash. 678, 233 Pac. 293, was decided on
the same day as Ashford v. Reese and rests on the same theory.
' Substitute House Bill No. 170, Extraordinary Session, 1925, entitled, "An
Act relating to contracts for the sale of real property," reads as follows:
"Section 1. A contract for the sale of real property, when acknowledged
by the vendor, may be recorded in the same manner as a deed of the property,
and when recorded shall be constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and
encumbrancers of the rights of the vendee under the contract.
"Sec. 2. If real property in the possession of a vendee under an executory
contract for the purchase thereof be destroyed or damaged without fault of
the vendor, the vendee is not thereby relieved of his obligation to perform. A
vendee is deemed to have possession if he has the right thereto and the vendor
has not actual possession."
This bill passed the House with a vote of 75--2 (House Journal 1925, p.
224). In the Senate this bill was unanimously passed in an amended form
(Senate Journal, p. 455) by striking out all but the enacting clause and sub-
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It is not the purpose of this brief article to reiterate what has here-
tofore been discussed both in the opinions of the Court and in these
pages ;5 but merely, for the sake of completeness, to refer to some of
the Washington cases not heretofore referred to in this controversy,
in either the majority or dissenting opinion or elsewhere, because they
have been misdigested and lost in the books. The most significant cases
are perhaps State Ex rel. Trimble v. The Superior Court,' Crowley v.
Byrne, 7 and Roy v. Vaughn" The astonishing feature of the first
case is that it expressly repudiates the doctrine which is now the rule
of the Court, stating that the rule of the vendees' equitable ownership is,
"so firmly settled against the contention of the relators by
a train of uncontroverted authority that it is now beyond the
realm of legitimate controversy."
In the case of State Ex rel. Trimble v. Superior Court,9 the question
arose whether the vendee under an executory forfeitable contract to
stituting therefor the following (which was almost verbatim Senate Bill No.
254, introduced in the Senate earlier in the session)
"Section 1. An executory contract for the sale of real property to be valid
at law must be in writing and signed by both vendor and vendee. The vendee
shall thereby acquire an equitable interest in such property, subject to becom-
ing forfeited or divested on default of any payment as provided in the contract
or default in the performance of any other covenant or promise on his part to
be kept and performed in the manner provided in such contract or in such
manner as may be in accord with the principles and practice of equity. Acci-
dental destruction, in whole or in part, of the property described in such con-
tract while the same is executory, or other accidental change in the condition
of the property, or the taking or damaging of the whole or part of the prop-
erty by the exercise of eminent domain, shall not relieve the vendee of his
obligation to pay the purchase price or perform any other covenant therein to
he performed by him unless expressly so provided therein. The vendee, having
paid the full purchase price and kept the covenants and conditions to be per-
formed by him, shall be entitled to a deed of conveyance from the vendor in
manner and form as provided in such contract. Such contract, when acknowl-
edged by vendor in the manner and form provided for acknowledgment of
conveyances of real property, shall be entitled to record in the office of the
auditor of the county where such property is situated, and when so recorded
and properly indexed, shall be constructive notice to all the world of the rights
and interest therein of the vendor and vendee as set forth in such contract.
Provided, that the plaintiff in any action on such an executory contract where-
in part or whole of the remedy sought is possession of the premises the plain-
tiff may apply for and obtain possession and the defendant may retain posses-
sion by means of the summary proceeding provided in sections 819, 820 and 821
of Remington's Compiled Statutes of Washington, 1922."
The House refused to concur in the amendment and requested that the
Senate recede. This the Senate refused to do, and asked for a conference.
(House Journal, 1925, pp. 562, 594; Senate Journal, 563). And there the bill
died.
P John Lichty, "Rights and Estates of Vendor and Vendee under an
Executory Contract for the Sale of Realty." 1 WAsH. L. REv. 9.
031 Wash. 445, 72 Pac. 89 (1903).
771 Wash. 444, 129 Pac. 113 (1912).
100 Wash. 345, 170 Pac. 1019 (1918).
See note 6, supra.
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purchase real estate was entitled to damages in a condemnation pro-
ceeding. In holding that the vendee's interest was real property, and
that be was therefore entitled to damages, the Court said (p. 452)
"And, such being the law in this state, the learned counsel
for the relators contend that the relators have no
estate, either legal or equitable, therein, and they cite several
authorities holding, in effect, that in law the vendee in a mere
executory contract for the sale of land obtains no real property
or interest ur4 real property that the relations between the
parties to the contract are wholly personal, that the vendees
right is a mere thing in action, and that it is only when the
vendee performs, or offers to perform, all the acts necessary
to entitle him to a deed, that he has an equitable title and
may compel a conveyance. We have no doubt that,
as between the parties to a contract for the sale and purchase
of land, the vendee therein named does not became the full
equitable owner until he performs or offers to perform all
the acts necessary to entitle him to a conveyance of the land
and to a specific performance of the contract in a court of
equity; but it does not necessarily follow that a vendee in such
a contract has no interest or estate whatever in the land cov-
ered by the agreement, which may not be controlled or divested
by law. (p. 453) It (the respondent corporation)
simply seeks, as we have already said, to appropriate, condemn,
and acquire the entire interest of the relators in said tide
lands, namely, their equitable ownership thereof, and their
entire interest in said agreement with the State of Wash-
ington for the sale and conveyance thereof; and also the
entire apparent interest of said Remsberg and wife therein,
all subject to the obligation imposed by the terms of said
agreement upon the vendee therein named, and his assigns,
to pay to the state the balance of the purchase price therein
specified, with interest as therein provided for. We are
clearly of the opinion that counsel are in error in assuming
that the relatdrs have, as between themselves and the railroad
company no interest in the lands in controversy, which is
subject to be taken under the power of eminent domain.
(p. 454). The interest of the relators is, to say the
least, an interest in land, and as such may be taken for a
public use by condemnation, upon payment of just compensa-
tion thereof (p. 455).
The Court then refers to the decision of Martin v. Scofield,10 in
which it is held that the vendee in an ordinary land contract with right
of possession, is to be regarded as the equitable owner, and, after quoting
at length from that decision, our Court, per Anders, J., says as follows:
(p. 459)
"141 Wis. 167 (1876).
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"The doctrine announced in the case last cited as to the
relation between the parties to a valid contract for the sale
of land is so firmly settled against the contention of the
relators 'by a train of uncontroverted authority that it is now
beyond the realm of legitimate controversy. This doctrine
of 'equitable conversion' has been applied in a great many
cases and under divers circumstances."
Thereupon the Court quotes at length from a great many authorities,
including the leading English case of Lysaght v. Edwards,"- holding
that an executory contract for the purchase of real estate changes the
ownership in equity, and that the purchaser becomes the equitable
owner of the land. Among other things, the Court supports its position
with the following significant statement (p. 461)
"The doctrine of equitable conversion has also been fre-
quently invoked in determining upon whom should fall the
loss, and who should be entitled to the insurance, if any,
in case of destruction by fire of buildings situated upon land
under an executory contract of sale."
A number of cases are cited to support the foregoing statement in
all of which it is held that the vendee, being the equitable owner,
should bear the loss. This appears to be the only statement that our
Court has made, prior to Ashford v. Reese, supra, with reference to
who shall bear the loss where the land in question is held under an
executory contract of sale; and while risk of loss from destruction by
the elements was not squarely in issue in that case, the argument of
the Court assumes, and the conclusion reached in that case recognizes,
that the vendee, being the equitable owner, suffers the loss whether
it be one imposed by law, as in a condemnation proceeding, or accom-
plished by the elements, such as fire.
Then the Court, after quoting with approval the statement from
LEwis oN EMINENT DOMAIN to the effect that "the vendee under an
executory contract of sale is the equitable owner," concludes as fol-
lows (p. 462)
"It seems clear to us, in view of the foregoing authorities,
that the relators must be regarded as the real owners of the
lots in question, subject only to the right of re-entry and
forfeiture on the part of the state in the event of a failure on
their part, or that of their successors or assigns, to pay the
balance of the purchase price according to the terms of the
state's contract.!
1 L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 499 (1875).
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The Court then quotes from Washington Iron Works Company v.
King County,1 2 in which the Court said.
"In equity, appellants are the owners, possessing a real and
substantial interest, which they can assign, transfer, and dis-
pose of as they choose; and the state cannot deprive them of
this right. The naked legal title is in the state, but for
one purpose only-to secure the unpaid purchase price."
This case, then, stands for the doctrine that under an executory
forfeitable contract for the purchase and sale of real property, the
vendee acquires an equitable interest in land.
The Trimble case, supra, has been interpreted by the federal courts,
following the state law, as holding that the vendee under an executory
contract of sale becomes the equitable owner thereof.
In Scofield v. Baker,13 Neterer, District Judge, concludes that the
vendee under a contract for the purchase and sale of real estate, is the
equitable owner thereof, after a review of a number of Washington
cases. '
In the appeal of the same case to the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit,' the question arose whether an executory contract
for the purchase of real estate on which there was still a number of
installments due, constituted real property or personal property in the
hands of the vendee. In that case the receiver of an insolvent bank
under an order authorizing him to sell certain personal property,
assumed to convey the vendee's interest under an executory contract
of sale. The Circuit Court of Appeals in holding that the receiver's
action with without right and authority, said as follows:
"But there is a stronger reason why the order of the court
was insufficient to confer upon the receiver authority for the
assignment to Simpson. The assets to be sold were stated to
consist of 'bills receivable, judgments, overdrafts, stocks,
bonds, warrants, securities, assessments on stockholders of
said bank, and other personal and chattel property and evi-
dence of indebtedness.' The order 'of the court in terms
applied only to personal property. Under the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the State of Washington, the interest of the
bank in the tide land under the agreement to purchase was real
'.0 ,Vash. 150, 54 Pac. 1004 (1898).
13 212 Fed. 504, 508 (1914).
14 Washington Iron Works Co. v. King County, 20 Wash. 150, 54 Pac.
1004 (1898), State ex rel. Wilson v. Grays Harbor and Puget Sound By. Co.,
60 Wash. 32, 110 Pac. 676 (1910), State ex rel. Trzmble v. Superior Court, 31
Wash. 44S, 72 Pae. 89 (1903), State v. Prost, 95 Wash. 134, 64 Pac. 902 (1901),
Hotchktn v. Bussell, 46 Wash. 7, 89 Paa. 183 (1907).1s921 Fed. 329, 329, 136 C. C. A. (9th Cire.) 390 (1915).
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estate. Washington Iron Works v. King County 31 Wash.
150, 54 Pac. 1004, Trimble v. Superior Court, 31 Wash.
445, 72 Pac. 89, State Ex. rel. Wilson v. Grays Ha 'bor &
Puget Sound Railway Company 60 Wash. 32, 110 Pac. 676."
In the case of Crowley v. Byrne,"6 the Court went still further. It
was there held that a mere option contract which had- not yet reached
the stage of a binding executory agreement for the purchase and sale
of land, gave the holder of the option an interest in real estate. In
that case the Court refused to follow a line of authorities holding that
an option does not vest in the holder of the option an interest in land,
and chose to follow a line of authorities holding that the granting of
an option to purchase constitutes the grantee the equitable owner of
an interest in real property. Interestingly enough, the conclusion in
that case was based in part on a case deciding that the holder of an
option to purchase real estate was entitled to the insurance money
payable for damage to the property on which the option was held,
after the making of the contract for the option, but before the exercise
of the option, on the theory that the mere making of the option, even
before its exercise, gave the holder thereof an equitable interest in real
estate..7 Following that line of reasoning our Court concludes (p. 450)
"We are of the opinion that as between parties the option
contract gave appellant an interest in the land such as re-
spondents were bound by, having notice thereof, even though,
at the time they acquired the quit claim deed from Sarah J.
Waits, appellant had not exercised his option or paid any part
of the purchase price, and that upon receiving the deed from
Sarah J. Waits within the life of the option, thus evidencing
the exercise of the option on the part of appellant and the
receipt of the purchase price on the part of Sarah J. Waits,
the title acquired by appellant related back to the date of
his acquiring the option."
This case has never been overruled or referred to, and creates the
anomalous situation that the holder of a mere option has an equitable
interest in land, whereas the holder of a binding executory contract of
purchase has not.
In Roy v. Vaughn,'8 supra, where the contract was executory and
contained a forfeiture clause, the Court said.
"See note 7, supra.
"People St. By. Co. v. Spencer 156 Pa. St. 85, 27 At. 113, 36 Am. St. Rep.
-221 (1893).
"See note 8, supra; Roy v. Vaughn, note 3, supra. Respondent's Brief,
p. 2: "The contract is in usual form and contains a forfeiture paragraph."
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"We have here nothing more than the relation between the
vendor and vendee in the ordinary contract of sale and pur-
chase wherein the vendor retains the legal title as security for
the payment of the purchase price, covenanting that, when so
paid, he will convey the land to the vendee, a relation anal-
ogous to that of mortgagor and mortgagee. When default
is made in such a contract, the vendor may, as in other cases,
either affirm or disaffirm the contract. In the first case, which
is the remedy here sought, he seeks enforcement of the contract
by either suing at law, for the amount due, or foreclosing it in
equity, as he would a mortgage given to secure the payment
of money, there being 'no sensible distinction between the case
of a legal title conveyed to secure the payment of a debt, and
a legal title retained to secure payment.' JONEs, LiENS
(3d. ed.), § 1108."
In the foregoing case the forfeiture clause was directly in issue and
was not overlooked. The original complaint sought enforcement of
the forfeiture clause, the amended complaint sought recovery of the
balance due, to have that amount declared a lien, and to have the
lien foreclosed. The point was squarely decided that this change did
not constitute an election of remedies, because certain conditions
precedent to invoking the forfeiture clause had not been complied with.
Moreover, it seems a safe contention to make that the case of Roy
v. Vaughn, supra, is a repudiation of Tieton Hotel Go. v. Manhezm, °1
and dicta from the cases on which it is based. In the first place, in the
legal conception of the relation between vendor and vendee in an
executory forfeitable contract the cases are opposed. Furthermore, an
examination of the briefs in Roy v. Vaughn, supra, shows that the
apparent conflict between Tieton Hotel Co. v. Manhem,20 , and
Taylor v. Interstate Investment Co.,2' was argued in the briefs
and the language in the Tieton case, supfra, shown to be out of harmony
"75 Wash. 641, 135 Pac. 658 (1913).
"See note 19, supra.
Roy v. Vaughn, note 3, supra. Respondent's Brief, p. 26: "The above
section of Pomeroy, on page 502 [Reference is to second edition; in fourth
edition see 1 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. pp. 686, 688] is appended a note which makes
clear the apparent ambiguity in the Washington cases (Taylor v. Interstate
Investment Co. and Tieton Hotel Co. v. Manheim, 75 Wash. 641)."
The note from Pomeroy referred to, which is set forth in full in the re-
spondent's brief, reads as follows:
"It is a great mistake, opposed to the fundamental notions of equity, to
suppose that the equity maxim does not operate, and the vendee does not be-
come the equitable owner until and as far as he has actually paid the stipulated
price. This erroneous view has sometimes been suggested, and sometimes even
held in a few American decisions; but it shows a misconception of the whole
equitable theory."
'75 Wash. 490, 135 Pac. 940 (1913). See discussion of the conffict in 1
WAsH. L. REV. 9, 17.
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with the general law Therefore, it seems a safe assumption that
when the Court used the above quoted language in Roy v. Vaughn,"
where an executory forfeitable contract was before the Court, and cited
Taylor v. Interstate Investment Co.,2 3 in support of the above quota-
tion, the language in Tieton Hotel Co. v. Manheim, supra, was dis-
approved and overruled and the theory of the Taylor case, supra,
adopted as to forfeitable executory contracts. It is unfortunate that
the Tieton case, supra, was not expressly repudiated rather than repu-
diated merely by implication.
Roy v. Vaughn, supra, was followed in Barton v. Tombari,24 although
in that case the contract did not contain a forfeiture provision.
Our Court then has often committed itself to the doctrine that the
vendee under an executory foreitable contract to purchase real estate
acquires an equitable interest in land. As said in State Ex rel. Trimble
v. Superior Court,25 supra, this doctrine
"is so firmly settled against the contention of the relators 'by
a train of uncontroverted authority' that it is now beyond the
realm of legitimate controversy."
The case of Reddish v. Smith,28 to which the present doctrine that
the vendee has no interest in land is usually traced, was written by
Judge Dunbar, the question there not being squarely in issue. It is
to be observed that the decision of the State Ex rel. Trimble v. Superior
Court,27 supra, in which the question is discussed at length, with many
appropriate quotations, for ten pages and the conclusion reached that the
vendee has an equitable interest in real estate was written by Judge
Anders and concurred in by Judges Dunbar, Fullerton, Mount and
Hadley. The case of Crowley v. Byrne28 , supra, in which it was held
that the holder of a mere option to purchase acquired an equitable
interest in real estate, was concurred in by Judges Parker, Mount,
Crow, Gose and Chadwick. The decision in Roy v. VaughnY9 supra,
was approved by Judges Morris, Holcomb, Ellis, Mount and Chad-
wick.
Moreover, the decision in the case of Schaefer v. Gregory Com-
pany 20 which may be said to be the leading case for the recent doctrine,
"See note 8, supra.
75 Wash. 490, 135 Pac. 240 (1913).
-120 Wash. 331, 907 Pac. 239 (1929) 124 Wash. 696, 214 Pac. 170 (1923).
31 Wash. 445, 459, 72 Pac. 89 (1903).
10 Wash. 178, 38 Pac. 1003, 45 Am. St. Rep. 781 (1894). See discussion
of this case in 1 WASH. L. REv. 9, 13.
-"See note 6, supra.
"See note 7, supra.
"See note 8, supra.
112 Wash. 408, 192 Pac. 968 (1920).
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is squarely contrary in result to State ex rel. Trimble. v. Superior
Court,8' supra. In the latter case it was held that the vendee under
a forfeitable executory contract, being the equitable owner, was entitled
to damages in a condemnation proceeding, whereas in the former case
(without any reference to the Trimble case, supra, and without over-
ruling it) the Court held that the vendee under an executory contract
was not the equitable owner and therefor not entitled to damages in
a condemnation proceeding.
Furthermore, the case of Schaefer v. Gregory Co., supra, is rested on
cases all decided prior to Roy v. Vaugh;r, supra, principally Tieton
Hotel Co. v. Manheim, supra, and Converse v. LaBarge,32 which fol-
lows it. Hence we have the anomalous situation of Schaefer v. Gregory
Co., supra, being rested on impliedly overruled cases, and of this same
case being the sole authority cited by the majority of the Court in
Ashford v. Reese, supra.
It now seems to be the law of this state that where a contract does
not contain a forfeiture clause the vendee has an equitable interest in
land which may be foreclosed. (See Taylor v. Interstate Investment
Co.,8 ' Barton v. Tombari,8 4 Stevens v. Irwin,i5.) However, where
the contract contains a forfeiture clause, the vendee has no interest in
land either legal or equitable. (See supra, Schaefer v. Gregory Co.,"
Ashford v. Reese17 .) Is it logical to say that a forfeiture clause, which
does not purport to make any declaration as to the character of the title
conveyed by the contract, but merely to operate upon the title con-
veyed, whatever it may be, shall be construed to determine the very
nature of the title conveyed? If so, may it not be argued with equal
force that a lease containing a forfeiture clause, does not convey any
element of title to the lessee? 8 Yet it has never been so held.
If the Court now endeavors to maintain its most recent position with
reference to the rights of the vendee under an executory contract of sale,
by mahing a distinction between an executory contract containing a
" See note 6, 8upra.
9-2 Wash. 282, 158 Pac. 958 (1916).
'3 See note 23, supra.
U See note 24, supra.
23 132 Wash. 289, 031 Pac. 783 (1925). According to Roy v. Vaughn, fore-
closure may also be had if the contract contains a forfeiture clause.
" See note 30, aupra.
"See note 2, supra.
Is It is true that in a lease a legal estate is conveyed to the lessee, whereas
in an executory contract, under the established equity rule, merely, an equitable
estate is conveyed. But tis distiletion can, on principle, have no bearing on
the effect of a forfeiture clause.
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forfeiture clause and one not containing a forfeiture clause, it is suf-
ficient to say that neither at law nor in equity has such a distinction
ever been made. Moreover, it does not seem logical to say that the
vendee has no interest in real estate because his interest may be for-
feited. The very provision for forfeiture assumes that he has an
interest and that interest, not a mere chattel interest, hut such an
interest as the vendee would have under the applicable law, because the
forfeiture clause does not assume to change the character of the interest
acquired by the vendee but merely to forfeit that interest, whatever the
law says it consists of. It is not the forfeiture clause which, zpso facto,
negatives the vendee's having an equitable interest in land. The same
equity jurisprudence which gives the vendee an equitable interest also
recognizes the propriety and enforcibility of forfeiture clauses; for while
equity abhors a forfeiture, it will nevertheless, in a proper case en-
force it. 9
The established doctrine of equity and the one that is regarded by
the overwhelming weight of authority as in accord with sound policy
and practice, is that the vendee under a forfeitable executory contract
acquires an interest in land, upon which a judgment is a lien, which
may be attached, and upon which execution may be levied, 40 and which
is devisable by the vendee, and descendible to his heirs as real estate.
41
If our Court would now so hold (which it is not too late42 to do in
view of the conflicting holdings in our decisions, and the different views
which different members of the present Court have taken at different
times) the rule in this state would again be in accord with the virtually
uniform current of authority elsewhere and make it unnecessary for the
legislature to intervene.
Alfred J Schweppe.*
University of Washington.
110 R. C. L. 331.
"o See in State ex rel. Trimble v. Superior Court, 31 Wash. 445, 461, 72 Pac.
89 (1903), the approved quotation from Fish v. Fowlie, 58 Cal. 373 (1881). See
also legal incidents of the relation as stated in Mark v. L. - L. it G. Ins. Co.,
159 Minn. 315, 198 N. W 1003 (1924).
41 See in State ex rel. Trimble v. Superior Court, 31 Wash. 445, 461, the
approved quotation from King v. Ruskman, 21 N. J. Eq. 559 (1870).
12In view of the conflicting decisions down to very recent date and of the
fact that the late cases by inadvertence rest on decisions previously impliedly
overruled, it is respectfully submitted that no fixed rule of property has been
established. Moreover, this Court has not hesitated to overrule cases relating to
community property. Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 Pac. 634 (1917)
Olive Co. v. Meek, 103 Wash. 467, 175 Pac. 33 (1918).
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